

FROM ATTACHMENT TO GELASSENHEIT: A HEIDEGGERIAN PHENOMENOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF ARJUNA'S CRISIS IN THE BHAGAVAD GITA

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ABSTRACT

Arjuna's crisis in the Bhagavad Gita is often interpreted as a moral or theological dilemma, yet this overlooks the profound psychological suffering depicted. This article re-examines this crisis not as a moral failure, but as a phenomenological portrait of absolute Attachment, a condition of painful enmeshment in the worldly web of relations. A Heideggerian phenomenological analysis is employed, using a close reading of the Gita's first chapter to diagnose the lived experience of Attachment and juxtaposing it with Martin Heidegger's concept of Gelassenheit (releasement). The analysis reveals Arjuna's paralysis as direct symptom of his entrapment in calculative thinking (rechnendes Denken) born from Attachment. In contrast, Gelassenheit is presented as a meditative path of releasement (besinnliches Nachdenken) that allows one to act within the world without being ontologically consumed by it. The concept of Gelassenheit thus emerges as a powerful existential framework for understanding and responding to the specific suffering caused by Attachment, providing a bridge for a fruitful dialogue between an ancient Eastern narrative and modern Western phenomenology.

Kata Kunci:

Keterikatan, Gelassenheit, Martin Heidegger, Bhagavad Gita. Fenomenologi

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ABSTRAK

Krisis Arjuna dalam Bhagavad Gita seringkali ditafsirkan sebagai dilema moral atau teologis, namun hal ini mengabaikan potret penderitaan psikologis mendalam yang digambarkan. Artikel ini mengkaji ulang krisis tersebut bukan sebagai kegagalan moral, melainkan sebagai sebuah potret fenomenologis dari Keterikatan (Attachment) absolut, sebuah kondisi keterjeratan yang menyakitkan dalam jejaring relasi duniawi. Sebuah analisis fenomenologis Heideggerian digunakan, melalui pembacaan-dekat (close readina) terhadap bab pertama Gita untuk mendiagnosis pengalamanterhidupi (lived experience) dari Keterikatan dan menyandingkannya dengan konsep Martin Heidegger tentang Gelassenheit (pelepasan diri). Analisis ini menyingkapkan bahwa kelumpuhan Arjuna adalah gejala langsung dari keterjebakannya dalam pemikiran kalkulatif (rechnendes Denken) yang lahir dari Keterikatan. Sebaliknya, Gelassenheit disajikan sebagai sebuah jalan meditatif (besinnliches Nachdenken) menuju pelepasan diri yang memungkinkan seseorang untuk bertindak di dalam dunia tanpa terkonsumsi secara ontologis olehnya. Konsep Gelassenheit dengan demikian muncul sebagai sebuah kerangka kerja eksistensial yang kuat untuk memahami dan merespons penderitaan spesifik yang disebabkan oleh Keterikatan,

I. INTRODUCTION

The opening scene of the Bhagavad Gita presents a profound paradox. On the grand stage of Kurukshetra, poised for a battle of cosmic significance, stands its greatest warrior, Arjuna. He is at the apex of his power, equipped with the divine bow Gāṇḍīva, surrounded by a formidable army ready to fight for righteousness. Yet, in this very moment of ultimate martial readiness, he undergoes a catastrophic internal collapse. This is not the calculated hesitation of a strategist nor the fear of a common soldier, but a complete psychological and physiological paralysis (Gita 1:26-47). This paper moves beyond traditional moral or theological interpretations to treat Arjuna's crisis as a powerful phenomenological portrait of existential suffering. It is a moment where the entire framework of meaning that constitutes a person's world disintegrates, revealing a universal human condition wherein one's most cherished bonds—to family, teachers, and tradition—become the very source of an unbearable and immobilizing torment.

This existential malady, which the text portrays with visceral detail, can be philosophically diagnosed as a condition of absolute Attachment. This is not merely an emotional bond, but a painful enmeshment in the worldly order, a state where one's identity is so thoroughly fused with relational roles and the anticipated outcomes of action that any threat to this web results in the fragmentation of the self (Anam, 2025, p. 15). To analyze the structure of this lived experience, this paper will employ a conceptual lens from the Western Heidegger's philosophical tradition: Martin concept of Gelassenheit (releasement) (Dalle Pezze, 2008, p. 5). This article argues that Arjuna's crisis in the Bhagavad Gita is a profound phenomenological portrait of suffering born from absolute Attachment. Furthermore, it posits that Martin Heidegger's concept of Gelassenheit offers a uniquely relevant existential path—not as a doctrinal solution, but as a mode of being-for understanding and moving through this specific human condition.

The Bhagavad Gita has, for millennia, been the subject of extensive commentary, from the classical theological expositions of figures like Śańkara and Rāmānuja to a vast array of modern analyses. In contemporary scholarship, its teachings have been applied to diverse fields such as psychology and mental well-being (Dhillon, 2023; Kalra et al., 2018), emotional intelligence (Lamba et al., 2023), and leadership and management theory (Dhamija et al., 2023; Kuknor et al., 2022). A common thread through much of this scholarship is a focus on the soteriological solutions offered within the text, primarily the path of Anasakti (non-attachment) as the central discipline of Karma Yoga. Discourse within Hindu philosophy itself, including contributions to this very journal, has explored related paths toward spiritual liberation, often emphasizing the essential nature of the human being and the methods for achieving release (kaivalya) from suffering (Sumertini, 2021a, 2021b). However, bv focusing predominantly on the solutions, these approaches often move past the initial crisis too quickly. This paper, in contrast, will take a deliberate step back. Instead of analyzing the proposed remedies, it will conduct a sustained phenomenological investigation into the problem itself: the lived experience of Arjuna's suffering.

Despite the vast scholarship, a significant gap remains in the analysis of Arjuna's crisis as a phenomenon in itself, prior to the introduction of any soteriological solution. Few studies have subjected the lived experience of his Attachment to a rigorous phenomenological analysis. Furthermore, while comparative studies exist, a specific and sustained dialogue between the existential condition of Arjuna and the Heideggerian path of *Gelassenheit* remains an underexplored territory. The novelty of this research, therefore, lies in its methodological approach. By employing a Heideggerian phenomenological lens, this paper offers a new vocabulary to diagnose Arjuna's suffering and provides a non-metaphysical, existential framework (*Gelassenheit*) for considering a path of release. This approach aims not to invalidate traditional readings, but to enrich them by revealing the universal existential structures at play within the text.

Therefore, this paper embarks on a focused phenomenological inquiry, one that intentionally moves beyond doctrinal exegesis to feel the very texture of Arjuna's suffering. Its initial step is to meticulously chart the structure of Attachment not as a mere concept, but as the lived experience of Arjuna's collapse. Following this diagnosis, the inquiry turns to the philosophy of Martin Heidegger, not to import a foreign solution, but to explore an alternative mode of being—*Gelassenheit* (Heidegger, 2000)—that resonates profoundly with the crisis at hand. This entire study is thus guided by a central question: How can Martin Heidegger's concept of *Gelassenheit* provide a relevant phenomenological framework for understanding and responding to the crisis of Attachment as depicted in the Bhagavad Gita?

II. RESEARCH METHODS

This study employs a qualitative philosophical methodology, specifically a Heideggerian phenomenological analysis. This approach is not concerned with empirical data collection or hypothesis testing in the scientific sense. Instead, its primary objective is to interpret and illuminate the meaning structures of a lived experience as it is presented in a foundational text (Kleinberg-Levin, 2020, pp. 11–19). The method involves a close reading of the first chapter of the Bhagavad Gita, treating the text as a rich description of the phenomenon of Attachment. The analysis will focus on describing the essential structures of Arjuna's crisis—its emotional, physiological, and identarian manifestations—as they are revealed in the narrative. The primary conceptual tool for this interpretive work is Martin Heidegger's concept of *Gelassenheit*, drawn principally from his discourse of the same name. The aim is to place the phenomenon (Arjuna's crisis of Attachment) into a direct dialogue with the concept *Gelassenheit* to see what each reveals about the other, thereby opening a new avenue for understanding a timeless human condition.

III. DISCUSSION

3.1. The Phenomenology of Attachment: A Visceral Hermeneutics of Arjuna's Collapse (Gita 1:26-47)

The crisis that immobilizes Arjuna at Kurukshetra is not initiated by a philosophical argument or a moral calculation, but by a singular, devastating phenomenological event: the act of seeing. Before this moment, Arjuna exists within the abstract and heroic framework of a righteous war, a *dharma yuddha*. His identity is clear, his purpose seemingly noble. Yet, his command to Kṛṣṇa is fatal in its existential curiosity: "ratham sthāpaya me'cyuta"—"place my chariot... in the middle of the two armies" (Gita 1:21). This demand to be

positioned between the opposing forces is a demand to move from the abstract concept of "enemy" to the concrete reality of the faces he must confront. What happens next is a cataclysmic implosion of his world, triggered by the gaze. When Arjuna looks (apaśyat), he does not see an anonymous opposing force; he sees "fathers, grandfathers, teachers, maternal uncles, brothers, sons, grandsons, and friends" (pitṛnatha pitāmahān, ācāryān mātulān bhrātṛn putrān pautrān sakhīmstathā) (Gita 1:26). The heroic narrative shatters, leaving him in what can only be described as an existential wasteland. The world is suddenly "disenchanted," stripped of its noble purpose and revealed as a stage for familial slaughter. This is not a failure of courage, but a crisis of Being itself, where the very ground of meaning collapses (Anam, 2025, pp. v, 23–24). The overwhelming pity (krpayā) and sorrow (visīdan) that engulf him (Gita 1:27-28) are not mere emotions; they are the symptoms of a deeper condition. The horror of this sight is unbearable precisely because his entire identity, his very sense of self, is woven from these relational threads. His being is not a sovereign, independent entity; it is a composite of his roles as a grandson to Bhīsma, a student to Drona, and a kinsman to the Kauravas. The gaze that reveals them as targets for his arrows simultaneously reveals his own impending self-annihilation. This moment of seeing, therefore, is the opening of the wound, the initial visceral manifestation of an absolute Attachment that has rendered his existence inseparable from the very world he is now commanded to destroy.

To name this condition merely as Attachment is to apply a sterile psychological label to a festering existential wound. What the Gita lays bare in Arjuna's collapse is the anatomy of a self that has no center of its own. This is not the common emotional bond that individuals form with the world; it is a more primordial state of being, a profound and agonizing enmeshment where the "I" has completely dissolved into its web of relations (Singhania & Mishra, 2024, pp. 15–17). Arjuna's selfhood is not a fortress that possesses attachments; it is the attachments themselves. His identity is a fragile tapestry woven entirely from external threads: the reverence for Bhīsma, the loyalty to Drona, the affection for his cousins (Gita 1:26). There is no sovereign "Arjuna" who exists independently of these roles; he is merely the nexus point where these relationships converge. This is the horrifying truth of absolute Attachment: it hollows out the individual, leaving a void where a self should be, and fills that void with the identities of others. Consequently, the command to fight is not a command to sever ties; it is a command for ontological suicide. To raise his bow against his grandfather is not an act of war against another, but an act of war against the very part of himself that is "grandson-of-Bhīsma." To release an arrow towards his teacher is to annihilate the "student-of-Drona" within him, a conflict he explicitly articulates when he asks how he could possibly attack figures who are worthy of his worship (pūjārhāvau) (Gita 2:4-5). The abyss that opens before him is not the void of cosmic meaninglessness, but the terrifying, personal void of his own imminent non-being if these constitutive relationships are destroyed. His paralysis is, therefore, the only logical response of a self that has been ordered to participate in its own dismemberment (Hirji, 2021, pp. 645–647).

The emotional manifestations of this crisis—the overwhelming pity ($kṛpay\bar{a}$ $paray\bar{a}viṣṭo$) and sorrow ($viṣ\bar{i}dan$) that the text emphasizes (Gita 1:27-28)—must therefore be understood not as noble sentiments of a compassionate warrior, but as the visceral symptoms of this ontological fragmentation. This is not the empathy of a self for an other; it is the agony of a self witnessing its own

impending execution. The pity he feels is a form of self-pity, projected onto the faces of those who constitute his very being (Anam, 2025, pp. ii—iii). Each enemy he sees is a mirror reflecting a part of his own identity that must be slaughtered. The sorrow is a grief for a self that is about to be rendered unrecognizable, a mourning for a world of coherent relations that is about to be irrevocably shattered. From a Nietzschean perspective, this is the psychology of decadence in its purest form: a will that has turned against itself, where the life-preserving instincts (in this case, the preservation of his relational identity) clash so violently with the demands of action that the result is total paralysis (Reginster, 2006, pp. 33–35). The pain is not a moral pain about doing something "wrong," but an existential pain of a composite being whose constituent parts have been set to war against each other. His sorrow is the sound of his own inner world tearing itself apart.

Following this emotional implosion, the crisis descends from the mind into the flesh. The text provides a chilling physiological account of a body in revolt, a visceral hermeneutic of a self rejecting its own command to act. "My limbs grow weak and my mouth is drying up," Arjuna laments, "my body trembles and my hair stands on end" (sīdanti mama gātrāni mukham ca pariśusyati, vepathuśca śarīre me romaharsaśca jāyate) (Gita 1:29). This is not the language of ethics, but of cellular rebellion. His body, in its primordial wisdom, understands the truth of the situation more profoundly than his confused intellect: the act of war demanded of him is an act of self-harm. The trembling (vepathuh) is the vibration of a being tearing itself apart. The dry mouth is the thirst of a soul whose lifesource has been poisoned. The final, devastating image is that of the Gandiva, his divine bow and symbol of his very identity as a warrior, slipping from his grasp (qāndīvam sramsate hastāt) as his skin feels as if it is on fire (Gita 1:30). This is the ultimate physiological veto. His hands, the instruments of his will and power, refuse to participate in the act of self-dismemberment. The body, in this moment, becomes the last bastion of authenticity, refusing to enact the lie that he can remain whole while destroying the very relationships that constitute him. This is the lived experience of nihilism made flesh: a profound alienation from one's own body, which now operates not as a vehicle for the will, but as a final, desperate witness against it (Merleau-Ponty, 2013, pp. 45–46).

Finally, the schism erupts from the silent flesh into the spoken word. Ariuna's subsequent arguments against the war (Gita 1:31-46) are not a coherent ethical discourse; they are the frantic, desperate rationalizations of a shattered identity. This is the cacophony of a self at war with its own constituent parts. When he laments the sin of killing kinsmen, it is the voice of "Arjuna-the-cousin" screaming against the duty of "Arjuna-the-warrior." When he speaks of the horror of striking down his teachers, it is "Arjuna-the-student" recoiling from an act that would annihilate his own past. He cannot be a "good grandson," a "loyal student," and a "righteous warrior" simultaneously; the battlefield has rendered these identities mutually exclusive. Attachment has forged a self so utterly dependent on external roles that when these roles come into conflict, the self has no sovereign ground upon which to stand, no central "I" to arbitrate the internal civil war. His paralysis is the logical outcome of this impossible equation. He is a ghost haunting the ruins of his own identity, a collection of irreconcilable duties and affections (Mead, 2018, pp. 66–68). His final declaration—that it would be better to be slain unarmed and unresisting (Gita 1:46)—is not a turn towards pacifism, but the ultimate expression of this internal collapse: the logical conclusion for a

being who, having no self left to preserve, sees annihilation as the only escape from an unbearable contradiction.

3.2. Gelassenheit as a Path of Releasement: A Dialogue with Arjuna's Crisis

To understand a potential path through the paralysis of Attachment, we turn to Martin Heidegger's discourse on Gelassenheit. This turn is not to import a foreign solution, but to use Heidegger's thought as a mirror to reflect the very structure of Ariuna's crisis. Heidegger distinguishes between two fundamental modes of thinking: calculative thinking (das rechnende Denken) and meditative thinking (das besinnliche Nachdenken) a distinction central to his later critique of technological rationality (Kleinberg-Levin, 2020, p. 17). Calculative thinking, he explains, is the dominant mode of the modern age. It computes, plans, and organizes with the intent to serve specific purposes. This mode of thought "races from one prospect to the next" (hetzt von einer Chance zur nächsten) and "never stops, never collects itself" (hält nie still, kommt nicht zur Besinnung) (Heidegger, 2000, p. 14). It is a thinking that seeks to master and control reality by reducing it to a series of problems to be solved and outcomes to be secured. This is, with chilling precision, the cognitive labyrinth in which Arjuna is entrapped. His entire monologue (Gita 1:31-45) is a masterful, yet agonizing, display of rechnendes Denken. He is not engaged in a quiet, meditative contemplation of his situation; he is performing a frantic, feverish calculation of consequences. He calculates the $\sin(p\bar{a}pam)$ that will accrue from the slaughter (1:36), the catastrophic destruction of family traditions (kuladharmāh sanātanāh) (1:40), the ensuing social chaos (varnasankarah) (1:41), and the damnation of his ancestors (patanti pitaro hyesām) (1:42). His mind is a battlefield of competing variables, a desperate ledger of moral profit and loss. It is precisely because he attempts to master this impossible existential situation through calculation that he becomes its prisoner. The more he calculates, the more entangled he becomes in the web of consequences, leading not to clarity, but to a deeper paralysis. He is the perfect embodiment of a consciousness that has forgotten the alternative path: the quiet, receptive mode of das besinnliche *Nachdenken*, a thinking that does not grasp and compute, but waits and receives.

The path of meditative thinking leads toward the existential comportment that Heidegger names Gelassenheit. At its core, this is a "releasement toward things" (die Gelassenheit zu den Dingen) (Heidegger, 2000, p. 24). This is not a state of passive indifference, but a dynamic posture of simultaneous engagement and freedom. Heidegger describes it as the ability to say both "yes" and "no" to the world of objects and demands; to use them, to live amongst them, yet to remain so free from them that we can "let them go at any time" (wir sie jederzeit loslassen) (Heidegger, 2000, p. 23). It is precisely this capacity to loslassen that is ontologically impossible for Arjuna. For him, the kinsmen and teachers arrayed for battle are not mere *Dinge* (things) or objects in his world toward which he can cultivate a releasement. As we have seen, they are the very constituents of his being; they are not external possessions but internal architecture. The demand of war is not a demand to release an object, but to release a part of his own self. His Attachment has collapsed the distinction between self and other, between subject and the world a condition that can be understood in Hindu philosophical terms as the crisis of an Ahamkara (ego-sense) that is wholly constituted by worldly relations and identifications (Jakubczak, 2006, pp. 187–189). Therefore, the Heideggerian practice of loslassen becomes, from Arjuna's perspective, an act of self-mutilation. He cannot "let go" of his attachment to Bhīṣma without ceasing to be "Bhīṣma's grandson." Faced with this impossible demand for an external releasement, Arjuna performs the only releasement available to him: an internal one. In the final, climactic verse of the chapter, he lets go not of his attachments, but of his agency. He casts away his bow and arrow (*visṛjya saśaraṁ cāpaṁ*), the very symbols of his will and capacity to act, and sinks into his chariot, his mind overcome with grief (*śokasaṁvignamānasaḥ*) (Gita 1:47). This is a tragic inversion of *Gelassenheit*: unable to release the world that constitutes him, he releases the self that must act in it.

This practice of *Gelassenheit* cultivates two intertwined states: a profound calm and an "openness to the mystery" (Offenheit für das Geheimnis) (Heidegger, 2000. p. 25). The relationship with the world becomes "wonderfully simple and calm" (auf eine wundersame Weise einfach und ruhig) (Heidegger, 2000, p. 24), not because the world's complexities have vanished, but because the will to master them has been released. Arjuna's state is the radical antithesis of this calm. His mind is explicitly described as chaotic and confused: "bhramatīva ca me manah"-"my mind is reeling" (Gita 1:30). This inner turmoil is a direct consequence of his fundamental lack of openness. He is not open to the mystery of his situation; on the contrary, he desperately demands that the situation conform to the pre-existing moral and relational calculus that has, until this moment, defined his reality. He needs the world to be knowable, predictable, and justifiable within the framework of his attachments. The battlefield, however, presents him with a mystery—a demand that is ethically monstrous yet dharmically necessary—that shatters this framework. The war refuses to be a solvable problem; it reveals itself as an abyss of contradiction. Because his entire being is predicated on a closed system of meaning, when faced with a mystery that his system cannot compute, he does not open up to it; he collapses, embodying the very crisis that arises from the confrontation between the human demand for rational unity and the unreasonable silence of the world (Gordon, 2016, pp. 590-591). His Attachment has made him rigid, and when the unvielding mystery of existence presses against this rigidity, the only possible outcome is to break. Gelassenheit, in this context, would have been the capacity to dwell within this unbearable contradiction, to wait in the open, to let the mystery be a mystery without demanding an immediate, rational solution.

Ultimately, Gelassenheit is not a technique to be applied, a moral solution to be implemented, or a psychological state to be achieved. It is a fundamental shift in one's entire comportment toward the world, a reorientation of Being itself (Dalle Pezze, 2008, pp. 136–140). It is the path of waiting (warten), a waiting that does not expect (erwarten) a specific outcome, but rather opens itself to the Open (das Offene) (Heidegger, 2000, p. 55). This waiting is an active stillness, a courageous refusal to impose one's will upon the world. For Arjuna, trapped in the agony of Attachment, such a stance is inconceivable. His entire being is predicated on willing, calculating, and securing. He cannot simply "wait" in the face of the abyss; he must either conquer it with reason or be consumed by it. The path of Gelassenheit suggests a third way: to stand at the edge of the battlefield, amidst the cacophony of war horns and the unbearable sight of beloved faces, and to release the frantic need for a solution. It is to let the contradiction be a contradiction, to let the pain be pain, without demanding that it make sense within a pre-existing framework. It is the path of finding a new ground, not by building it through force of will, but by allowing oneself to be grounded in the very mystery that has shattered all previous foundations. This is not an escape from the world, but a deeper way of being within it—a way that allows for action not born from the anxiety of Attachment, but from a quiet, centered releasement.

This dialogue between Arjuna's crisis and Heidegger's thought reveals that the suffering born from Attachment is, at its core, a suffering born from a refusal to let the world be. Arjuna's pain is the pain of a consciousness that demands the world conform to its own structure of meaning, and shatters when the world refuses. *Gelassenheit*, therefore, emerges as the most profound response because it addresses the root of this suffering. It is the practice of relinquishing this demand, of releasing the self from its own tyrannical need for control and certainty. It is a path that does not promise to erase the tragedy of Kurukshetra, but offers a way to stand within it without being annihilated. It suggests that true strength is found not in the firmness of one's grip on the world, but in the courage to open one's hand. For Arjuna, this would mean picking up his bow not because he has calculated the outcome or accepted a new doctrine, but because, in a state of quiet releasement, the action becomes possible again, free from the crushing weight of the self that was once defined entirely by its attachments. It is a path toward finding a stillness not in the absence of the storm, but at its very center.

IV. CONCLUSION

The journey through Arjuna's crisis, from the visceral fragmentation of his being to the quiet contemplation of a path of releasement, culminates not in a profound answer. but in reorientation. This a phenomenological inquiry has sought to move beyond doctrinal exegesis to feel the very texture of the suffering that unfolds on the field of Kurukshetra, diagnosing it as the agony of absolute Attachment. We have seen this condition not as a mere emotional bond, but as a crisis of Being where the self, having no sovereign ground, dissolves into its relational world. Attachment is a prison built from the very architecture of love and duty; its walls are the faces of kinsmen, and its bars are the bonds of loyalty. Arjuna's paralysis is the stillness of a prisoner who realizes that to break free, he must destroy the very structure that gives him his name. In response, we brought forth Martin Heidegger's Gelassenheit, not to import a foreign solution, but to listen for a resonant whisper from a different philosophical landscape. Gelassenheit is not the opposite of Attachment; it is an entirely different ground for existence. It is not a technique for managing the world, but a way of dwelling within it, a quiet strength found not in the firmness of one's grip, but in the courage to open one's hand. The path of Gelassenheit does not lead one away from Kurukshetra; rather, it offers a way to stand within the storm, to be present to the tragedy without being consumed by it. It is the shift from the frantic, grasping nature of das rechnende Denken—the calculative thinking that defined Arjuna's desperate monologue—to the quiet, waiting posture of das besinnliche Nachdenken. This meditative thinking is an active, courageous stillness, an openness to the mystery (Offenheit für das Geheimnis) that Arjuna's Attachment made impossible. Where Arjuna demanded that the world make sense according to his rigid framework, Gelassenheit invites a surrender to the situation as it is, in all its terrifying ambiguity, recognizing that some truths are not problems to be solved, but mysteries to be inhabited. This dialogue between Arjuna's crisis and Heidegger's thought, therefore, does not offer a map to a new destination, but a compass pointing toward a different way of walking. By juxtaposing Arjuna's visceral suffering with this meditative path,

we do not invalidate the Gita's own wisdom. Instead, we illuminate a timeless human struggle: the tension between our deep-seated need to hold on and the quiet, persistent call to let go. The story of Arjuna thus becomes a mirror for our own modern entanglements, our own frantic calculations in a world that promises connection through a thousand digital threads, yet often leaves us more attached and more alone. The final question, then, is not one for this paper to answer, but one that echoes from the text and resonates within the reader's own quiet contemplation: In the midst of our own Kurukshetras, in the face of our own cherished attachments that constitute our very being, what does it mean to truly open one's hand?

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